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Optimal Budget Allocation in Social Networks: Quality or Seeding?
Arastoo Fazeli† Amir Ajorlou † Ali Jadbabaie†
Abstract— In this paper, we study a strategic model of
marketing and product consumption in social networks. We
consider two competing firms in a market providing two
substitutable products with preset qualities. Agents choose their
consumptions following a myopic best response dynamics which
results in a local, linear update for the consumptions. At some
point in time, firms receive a limited budget which they can use
to trigger a larger consumption of their products in the network.
Firms have to decide between marginally improving the quality
of their products and giving free offers to a chosen set of
agents in the network in order to better facilitate spreading
their products. We derive a simple threshold rule for the
optimal allocation of the budget and describe the resulting
Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the optimal allocation of
the budget depends on the entire distribution of centralities in
the network, quality of products and the model parameters. In
particular, we show that in a graph with a higher number of
agents with centralities above a certain threshold, firms spend
more budget on seeding in the optimal allocation. Furthermore,
if seeding budget is nonzero for a balanced graph, it will also be
nonzero for any other graph, and if seeding budget is zero for a
star graph, it will be zero for any other graph too. We also show
that firms allocate more budget to quality improvement when
their qualities are close, in order to distance themselves from
the rival firm. However, as the gap between qualities widens,
competition in qualities becomes less effective and firms spend
more budget on seeding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many recent studies have documented the role of social
networks in individual purchasing decisions [1]–[3]. More
data from online social networks and advances in information
technologies have drawn the attention of firms to exploit
this information for their marketing goals. As a result,
firms have become more interested in models of influence
spread in social networks in order to improve their marketing
strategies. In particular, considering the relationship between
people in social networks and their rational choices, many
retailers are interested to know how to use the information
about the dynamics of the spread in order to maximize
their product consumption and achieve the most profit in
a competitive market.
A main feature of product consumption in these settings
is what is often called the “network effect” or positive
externality. For such products, consumption of each agent
incentivizes the neighboring agents to consume more as
well, as the consumption decisions between agents and their
neighbors are strategic complements of each other. There are
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diverse sets of examples for such products or services. New
technologies and innovations (e.g., cell phones), network
goods and services (e.g., fax machines, email accounts),
online games (e.g., Warcraft), social network web sites (e.g.,
Facebook, Twitter) and online dating services (e.g., OkCu-
pid) are among many examples in which consuming from
a common product or service is more preferable for people.
Also, a main property of many products is substitution. A
substitute product is a product or service that satisfies the
need of a consumer that another product or service fulfills
(e.g. Pepsi and Coke or email and fax). In all these examples,
firms might be interested to take advantage of the social
network among people and the positive externality of their
products and services to trigger a larger consumption of their
products. Therefore, it might be important for firms to know
how to shape their strategies in designing their products and
offering them to a set of people in order to promote their
products intelligently, and eventually achieving a larger share
of the market.
In this paper, we study strategic competition between
two firms trying to maximize their product consumption.
Firms simultaneously allocate their fixed budgets between
seeding a set of costumers embedded in a social network and
improving the quality of their products. The consumption of
each agent is the result of its myopic best response to the
previous actions of its peers in the network. Therefore, a firm
should provide enough incentives for spread of its product
through the payoff that agents receive by consuming it. For
this purpose and considering their budgets, firms should
strategically design their products and know how to initially
seed the network.
We model the above problem as a fixed-sum game between
firms, where each firm tries to maximize discounted sum
of its product consumption (i.e. market share) over time,
considering its fixed budget. We derive a simple rule for
optimal allocation of the budget between improving the
quality and new seeding which depends on the network
structure, quality of products, and parameters of the model.
It is shown that the optimal allocation of the budget depends
on the entire centrality distribution of the graph. Specially,
we show that maximum seeding occurs in a graph with
maximum number of agents with centralities above a certain
threshold. Also, the difference in qualities of firms plays an
important role in the optimal allocation of the budget. In
particular, we show that as the gap between the qualities
of the products widens, the firms allocate more budget to
seeding.
It is worthwhile to note that the problem of influence
and spread in networks has been extensively studied in the
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past few years [4]–[10]. Also, diffusion of new behaviors
and strategies through local coordination games has been
an active field of research [11]–[18]. Goyal and Kearns
proposed a game theoretic model of product adoption in [19].
They computed upper bounds of the price of anarchy and
showed how network structure may amplify the initial budget
differences. Similarly, in [20] Bimpikis, Ozdaglar and Yildiz
proposed a game theoretic model of competition between
firms which can target their marketing budgets to individuals
embedded in a social network. They provided conditions
under which it is optimal for the firms to asymmetrically
target a subset of the individuals. Also, Chasparis and
Shamma assumed a dynamical model of preferences in [9]
and computed optimal policies for finite and infinite horizon
where endogenous network influences, competition between
two firms and uncertainties in the network model were
studied. The main contribution of our work is to explicitly
study the tradeoff between investing on improving the quality
of a product and initial seeding in a social network. Our
model is similar to the model proposed in [21], however,
instead of pricing strategy in [21], the notion of quality is
introduced and the tradeoff between quality improvement and
seeding is studied. Also, our model is tractable and allows us
to characterize the exact product consumption at each time,
instead of lower and upper bounds provided in [22], [23].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we introduce our model and update dynamics for agents
applying the myopic best response. In Section III, we study
the game played among the firms. Optimal budget allocation
strategy is presented in Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we
conclude the paper.
II. THE SPREAD DYNAMICS
There are n agents V = {1, . . . , n} in a social network.
The relationship among agents is represented by a directed
graph G = (V,E) in which agents i, j ∈ V are neighbors
if (i, j) ∈ E. The weighted adjacency matrix of the graph
G is denoted by a row stochastic matrix G where the ij-
th entry of G, denoted by gij , represents the strength of the
influence of agent j on i. For diagonal elements of matrix G,
we have gii = 0 for all agents i ∈ V . We assume that there
are two competing firms a and b producing product a and
b. Each agent has one unit demand which can be supplied
by either of the firms. We define the variable 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ 1− xi(t) ≤ 1 as the consumption of the product a
and b by agent i at time t.
Denote by qa > 0 and qb > 0 the quality of product a and
b respectively. The values of qa and qb can be interpreted
as the payoff that any two agents i and j would achieve if
they both consume the same product. In other words, we can
assume qa and qb are payoffs of the following game
xj 1− xj
xi qaxixj 0
1− xi 0 qb(1− xi)(1− xj)
Since agents benefit from the same action of their neighbors,
this game could be thought of as a local coordination game.
From the above table it follows easily that the payoff of
agents i and j from their interaction is
uij(xi, xj) = qaxixj + qb(1− xi)(1− xj).
We also assume that each agent benefits from taking action
xi irrespective of actions taken by its neighbors. We assume
the isolation payoff of consuming xi and 1−xi from product
a and b is represented by the following quadratic form
functions
uaii = qa(xi − x2i ), ubii = qb[(1− xi)− (1− xi)2].
This forms of payoff indicates that a product with higher
quality has a higher isolation payoff. The total isolation
payoff of agent i can be written as
uii(xi) = {qa(xi − x2i )}+ {qb[(1− xi)− (1− xi)2]}.
The above isolation payoff indicates that the isolation utility
of agent i disappears when xi = 0 or xi = 1, i.e. the
agent consumes only one of the product a or b. Assuming
quadratic form function for the isolation payoff not only
makes the analysis more tractable, but also is a good second
order approximation for the general class of concave payoff
functions. By changing the variables xi = 12 + yi we get
uij(yi, yj) = qa(
1
2
+ yi)(
1
2
+ yj) + qb(
1
2
− yi)(1
2
− yj),
uii(yi) = (qa + qb)(
1
4
− y2i ).
Therefore, the total utility of agent i from taking action yi
is given by
Ui(yi, ~y−i) = α{(qa + qb)(1
4
− y2i )}+ (1− α)
{qa
n∑
j=1
gij(
1
2
+ yi)(
1
2
+ yj) + qb
n∑
j=1
gij(
1
2
− yi)(1
2
− yj)},
(1)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 represents the weight that each agent
puts on its isolation payoff compared to the payoff from its
neighbors. In the above equation ~y−i denotes an action vector
of all agents other than agent i. From equation (1) we can
see that product a and b have a positive externality effect in
the network, meaning that the usage level of an agent has a
positive impact on the usage level of its neighbors. Therefore,
it follows that qa and qb in addition to the payoff of a
local coordination game, can be interpreted as coefficients
of network externality of product a and b respectively.
We assume agents repeatedly apply myopic best response
to the actions of their neighbors. This means that each agent,
considering its neighbors consumptions at the current period,
chooses the amount of the product that maximizes its current
payoff, as its consumption for the next period. In other words,
consumption of agent i at time t+ 1 is updated as follows
yi(t+ 1) = arg max
yi
Ui(yi(t), ~y−i(t)).
The above equation results in the following update dynamics
yi(t+1) = (
1− α
2α
)
n∑
j=1
gijyj(t)+(
(1− α)(qa − qb)
4α(qa + qb)
)
n∑
j=1
gij .
Therefore, the consumption of the product a can be written
as the following linear update dynamics form
y(t+ 1) = (
1− α
2α
)Gy(t) + (
(1− α)(qa − qb)
4α(qa + qb)
)1. (2)
Similarly, for the consumption of the product b we have
1− xi(t) = 12 − yi(t).
Assumption 1: We have 12 ≤ α, i.e. the self isolated
payoff has higher weight than the payoff from neighbors.
This assumption guaranties that 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1 for all i and
all t under the update rule (2).
Using the above assumption and defining
W , (1− α
2α
)G, ua , (
(1− α)(qa − qb)
4α(qa + qb)
)1, (3)
equations (2) can be written as
y(t+ 1) = Wy(t) + ua. (4)
Equation (4) can be expanded as
y(t) = W ty(0) +
t−1∑
k=0
W kua. (5)
Therefore, the consumption of agents depends on the initial
preference, i.e. y(0), the quality of product a and b, i.e. qa
and qb, and the structure of the network, i.e. the matrix G.
In the next section we discuss how firms can exploit this
information in order to maximize the consumption of their
products and also characterize a Nash equilibrium of the
game played between two firms.
III. THE GAME BETWEEN FIRMS
In this section we describe the game between firms where
each firm maximizes the spread of its product given a
fixed budget. As we mentioned earlier, firms produce their
products with some preset quality. At some point in time, say
t = 0, firms receive a fixed budget that they can either invest
on improving the quality of their products around the preset
value or spend it on new seedings of some agents or both.
This new seeding can be viewed as free offer to promote
their products in the network. We define the utility of each
firm as the discounted sum of its product consumption over
time
Ua(qa, qb) =
∞∑
t=0
δt1T (
1
2
+ y(t)),
Ub(qa, qb) =
∞∑
t=0
δt1T (
1
2
− y(t)).
As it can be seen from equations above, firms play a fixed-
sum game. Using equations (3) and (5) and defining the
centrality vector v by v = (I − δWT )−11 and noting that∑
vi =
2αn
2α−δ(1−α) , the utilities of firms can be written as
Ua(qa, qb) = (
n
2(1− δ) ) + v
T y(0) + λ(
qa − qb
qa + qb
),
Ub(qa, qb) = (
n
2(1− δ) )− v
T y(0)− λ(qa − qb
qa + qb
),
(6)
where
λ =
δ(1− α)n
2(1− δ)(2α− δ(1− α)) . (7)
We assume the cost of improving the quality by ∆q is given
by cq∆q where cq is a large number and the cost of each
unit of new seeding is given by cs. Each firm has a limited
budget that can spend on either new seeding, i.e. Sa and Sb,
or enhancing the quality of its product, i.e. ∆qa and ∆qb, or
both. In order to have 0 ≤ xi(0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 1−xi(0) ≤ 1
for all agents i, we impose the constraints ‖Sa + y(0)‖∞ ≤
0.5 and ‖Sb − y(0)‖∞ ≤ 0.5. This means that firms can
initially seed agents up to their demand capacity. Seeding
Sa and Sb will change the initial consumption of products a
and b by Sa−Sb and Sb−Sa respectively. From equation (6)
the marginal change in the payoff of firm a and b resulted
from the new investment are given by
∆Ua = v
TSa − vTSb + 2λqb∆qa
(qa + qb)2
− 2λqa∆qb
(qa + qb)2
,
∆Ub = v
TSb − vTSa + 2λqa∆qb
(qa + qb)2
− 2λqb∆qa
(qa + qb)2
.
Each firm maximizes its utility, or equivalently its marginal
payoff, given its fixed budget. Since the effect of the action of
firm b, i.e. Sb and ∆qb, is decoupled from that of the action
of firm a in ∆Ua, thus firm a should solve the following
optimization problem
max
Sa,∆qa
vTSa +
2λqb∆qa
(qa + qb)2
,
Subject to cs‖Sa‖1 + cq∆qa = Ka.
(8)
Similarly, for the firm b we have
max
Sb,∆qb
vTSb +
2λqa∆qb
(qa + qb)2
,
Subject to cs‖Sb‖1 + cq∆qb = Kb.
(9)
From equations (8) and (9) it can be seen that the optimal
strategy of each firm is independent of the action of the other
firm. This results in a Nash equilibrium to be simply the pair
of the optimal actions of the firms. In the next section we
discuss the optimal strategy of each firm and the resulting
Nash equilibrium.
IV. OPTIMAL BUDGET ALLOCATION STRATEGY
In this section we study how firms can maximize the
spread of their products by optimally allocating their fixed
budget between improving the quality of their products and
new seeding. We also describe a Nash equilibrium of the
game played between these two firms described in Section
III. The next theorem describes a simple rule for the optimal
allocation of the budget.
Theorem 1: For firm a, it is more profitable to seed agent
j rather than enhancing the quality of its product if vj > vac
where
vac , (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qb
(qa + qb)2
). (10)
Similarly, for firm b, it is more profitable to seed agent j
rather than enhancing the quality of its product if vj > vbc
where
vbc , (2λ)(
cs
cq
)(
qa
(qa + qb)2
). (11)
Moreover, any pair of the optimal strategies of the firms
described by the above threshold rules describes a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: From equation (10) the relative marginal utility
to cost for spending budget to seed agent j is vjcs . Therefore,
it is always more profitable to seed an agent with higher
centrality. Also, the relative marginal utility to cost for spend-
ing budget on enhancing quality of product a is 2λqbcq(qa+qb)2 .
Therefore, for firm a it is more profitable to seed agent j
rather than enhancing the quality of its product iff
vj
cs
>
2λqb
cq(qa + qb)2
.
This completes the proof. Similar story holds for firm b.
Moreover, since the best response of each firm resulting from
equations (8) and (9) is independent of the action of the
other firm, any Nash equilibrium of the game between firms
is simply a pair of firms best responses.
Following the above theorem, the optimal allocation of
the budget for each firm is to follow a so called water-
filling strategy, that is, to start seeding in the order of agents’
centralities until the centrality falls below the threshold given
by (10) for firm a or (11) for firm b (in which case the firm
spends the rest of the budget on improving the quality) or
the firm runs out of budget. Also, the amount that agents
can be seeded is up to their demand capacity, i.e. Smaxa =
(0.5)1−y(0) > 0 and Smaxb = (0.5)1+y(0) > 0. Also, note
that if the centrality of any agent is equal to the threshold
defined in (10) or (11), then firms are indifferent between
seeding that agent and quality improvement. Equations (10)
and (11) indicate that the optimal allocation depends on
quality of products, i.e. qa and qb, centrality distribution
of agents in the network, i.e. v, the parameter λ which
depends on discounting factor δ and network coefficient α,
and cost of seeding and quality improvement, i.e. cs and
cq . We will discuss the effect of each of these factors on
optimal allocation in the following subsections. For simplic-
ity, we only discuss optimal seeding budget; optimal quality
improvement budget can be found easily using the budget
constraint cs‖Sa‖1 + cq∆qa = Ka. All of our analysis here
is for firm a and similar results can be shown for firm b as
well.
A. Effect of Network Structure on Firms’ Decisions:
In this subsection we study the effect of network structure
on the optimal allocation of the budget for seeding and
quality improvement. First we define seeding capacity of a
graph.
Definition 1: The seeding capacity of a graph is the
amount that it can be seeded in the optimal allocation when
there is no budget constraint.
We first focus on two well studied graphs, i.e. star and
balanced graphs, and highlight how they can reflect important
properties of the seeding budget. Before continuing further,
we find the network centralities for these two graphs in the
next lemma.
Lemma 1: The centrality of the agents in a balanced graph
is given by v¯ = 2α2α−δ(1−α) . In a star graph, the centrality of
the central agent is
vh =
1 + δ(1−α)(n−1)2α
1− ( δ(1−α)2α )2
,
and the centrality of non central agents is
vl =
1 + δ(1−α)2α(n−1)
1− ( δ(1−α)2α )2
.
Moreover, for any arbitrary graph G, v¯ ≤ vmax ≤ vh, where
vmax = maxi∈V vi.
Proof: First part simply follows from the fact that v =
(I − δWT )−11, where W is given by (3), and that for any
agent i in a balanced graph
∑
gji =
∑
gij = 1. For the star
graph, noting that v = 1 + δWT v, we can obtain
vh = 1 + δ(n− 1)vl,
vl = 1 +
δvh
(n− 1) ,
solving which we can find vh and vl as given in the lemma.
Also, for any arbitrary graph G, vmax ≥
∑
vi
n = v¯. To
show vmax ≤ vh, assume that the maximum centrality occurs
for agent i. Again, using v = 1 + δWT v we can obtain
vj ≥ 1 + δ(1− α)
2α
gijvi,
using which for all j 6= i, we get
n∑
j=1
vj ≥ (n− 1) + (1 + δ(1− α)
2α
)vi.
Applying simple algebra along with the fact that
∑
vj =
2αn
2α−δ(1−α) leads to vi ≤ vh.
The next proposition provides a condition for seeding
profitability of any general graph. Also, the seeding capacity
of star and balanced graphs are compared and it is shown
that the graph with higher seeding capacity can be any of
the two, depending on the threshold value of vac in (10).
Proposition 1: If seeding capacity is nonzero for a bal-
anced graph, it will be nonzero for any other graph too.
On the other hand, if seeding capacity is zero for a star
graph, it will also be zero for any other graph. Moreover,
if vl < vac < v¯, a balanced graph has a larger seeding
capacity than a star graph, and if v¯ < vac < vh, a star graph
has a larger seeding capacity than a balanced graph. For
1 < vac < vl they have the same seeding capacity.
Proof: If seeding capacity is nonzero for a balanced
graph, then we have vac < v¯. As a result, for any other
graph we will have vac < vmax, since according to Lemma 1
v¯ ≤ vmax. This means that there exists at least one agent
that must be seeded. On the other hand, if seeding capacity
is zero for a star graph, then we must have vac > vh.
Since we know vh ≥ vi for any agent i of any arbitrary
graph, therefore, vac > vi and no agent can be seeded in
any other graph. For the second part of the proposition,
if vl < vac < v¯, then seeding capacity for the star graph
will be Smaxai , where S
max
a1 ≥ Smaxa2 ≥ · · · ≥ Smaxan are
elements of the demand capacity vector Smaxa and agent i is
the central agent. However, for the balanced graph all agents
can be seeded up to their maximum demand capacities and
the seeding capacity will be ‖Smaxa ‖1. On the other hand, if
v¯ < vac < vh, still seeding for the star graph will be S
max
ai ,
however, no agent can be seeded in the balanced graph. For
1 < vac < vl, agents in both graphs can be seeded up to
‖Smaxa ‖1.
Although star and balanced graphs give us useful insights
for seeding capacity in general graphs, extreme seeding
capacities do not necessary happen in those graphs. The next
proposition provides us with a lower and an upper bounds
for minimum and maximum seeding capacities.
Proposition 2: If 1 < vac < vh, the maximum seeding
capacity is given by
‖S∗a‖max1 =
k∑
i=1
Smaxai ,
where
k = min{b nδ(1− α)
(vac − 1)(2α− δ(1− α))
c, n}. (12)
On the other hand, the minimum seeding capacity is Smaxan
if 1 < vac < v¯, and is zero if v¯ < v
a
c < vh.
Proof: From condition (10) the more agents with
centralities above the threshold vac , the more seeding budget
can be allocated. Therefore, the maximum number of k
agents with centralities above the threshold vac must be found.
Since vi ≥ 1 for all agents, first a centrality of 1 is given to
each agent and then the remainder of the centrality sum is
distributed among maximum number of agents so that each
agent receives at least vac − 1, making its overall centrality
greater than vac . It is easy to see that the number of such
agents is upper bounded by b
2αn
2α−δ(1−α)−n
vac−1 c. This along with
the fact that 1 ≤ k ≤ n results in (12). Note that, in order
to complete the proof, we should also provide an example
achieving this maximum capacity. For k = 1, the maximum
seeding capacity is clearly achieved by the star graph with
the seeding capacity of Smaxa1 . For k ≥ 2, a graph with largest
seeding capacity is a k-star graph with k central agents with
the largest demand capacities and with equal centralities of
vh =
nδ(1− α)
k(2α− δ(1− α)) + 1,
where 1 ≤ k ≤ n is given in (12), and the remainder n −
k agents with the minimum centrality of vl = 1. For the
Fig. 1. A graph with maximum seeding capacity for Example 1
graph with minimum seeding capacity, similar to the proof of
Proposition 1, we have minimum seeding capacity of Smaxan
in star graph if 1 < vac < v¯, and zero in balanced graph if
v¯ < vac < vh.
Example 1: As a numerical example for the minimum and
maximum seeding capacities, we consider a network with
n = 15 agents with demand capacity vectors of Smaxa =
Smaxb = (0.5)1, qualities of qa = qb = 1, quality and
seeding costs of cs = cq = 1 and parameters of α = δ = 0.5.
For this example from equations (10) and (11) we have
vac = v
b
c = 2.5 and as a result, from equation (12) we
get k = 3. Therefore, a graph with the maximum seeding
capacity is a 3-star with seeding capacity of 1.5 as illustrated
in Fig. 1. Also, since v¯ = 43 < v
a
c , v
b
c < vh = 4.8, a
balanced graph has the minimum seeding capacity of zero.
A star graph has a seeding capacity of 0.5 which is neither
a minimum nor a maximum.
As we saw, the structure of the graphs with minimum and
maximum seeding capacity depends on the threshold value
of vac . However, for certain values of v
a
c the seeding capacity
will be independent of the structure of the graph, as described
in the next proposition.
Proposition 3: If vac > vh no graph can be seeded. On
the other hand, if vac < 1 all graphs can be seeded equally
up to agents’ maximum demand capacities.
Proof: The maximum possible centrality happens for
the central agent of the star graph as shown in Lemma 1.
As a result, if vac > vh, then we have v
a
c > vi for all i in
any graph and from condition (10) no agent can be seeded.
Also, since from definition 1 ≤ vi for all i, if vac < 1 then
we have vac < vi for all agents in any graph, and any graph
can be seeded up to agents’ maximum demand capacities,
given the availability of budget.
B. Effect of Quality of Products on Firms’ Decisions:
In this subsection we study the effect of the preset quality
of each product, i.e. qa and qb, on the optimal allocation of
seeding and quality improvement budgets.
As it can be seen from equation (10), the threshold vac
depends on both firm’s and its rival’s quality, i.e. both qa
and qb. In the next proposition we explain how the optimal
seeding budget depends on qa and qb.
Proposition 4: Given a fixed graph, the optimal seeding
budget is an increasing function of qa. Furthermore, it is
a decreasing function of qb if qb < qa and an increasing
function of qb if qa < qb.
Proof: The optimal seeding budget is a decreasing
function of the threshold value vac because if the threshold
value vac increases then there will be less (or same) agents
with centrality above the threshold which can be seeded in
the optimal allocation. Therefore, the optimal seeding budget
decreases. Also,
∂vac
∂qa
= k × −qb
(qa + qb)3
< 0,
for some constant k > 0. Therefore, the threshold value of
vac is a decreasing function of qa. This implies the first part
of proposition. For the second part we have
∂vac
∂qb
= k × (qa − qb)
(qa + qb)3
,
for some constant k > 0. Therefore, the threshold value of
vac is an increasing function of the quality of product b, when
qb < qa and a decreasing function of the quality of product
b, when qb > qa. This completes the proof.
Proposition 4 implies that higher quality in a firm’s product
results in a higher seeding budget in the optimal allocation.
This can be due to the diminish return of quality: when
quality is higher there is less need for quality improvement
and it would be more profitable to spend on seeding. Fur-
thermore, when qb < qa, the higher the quality of the rival
firm’s product, the lower the seeding budget of firm a, i.e.,
if qa ≥ q′b ≥ qb then, ‖S∗a(q′b)‖1 ≤ ‖S∗a(qb)‖1. On the
other hand, when competing with a firm whose product has a
higher quality, i.e. qb > qa, the higher the quality of the rival
firm’s product, the higher firm a should spend on seeding. In
other words, if qa ≤ qb ≤ q′b then, ‖S∗a(qb)‖1 ≤ ‖S∗a(q′b)‖1.
Combining these two results, we can see that given a fixed
value of qa, the seeding budget of firm a is increasing with
the difference |qa − qb|. The seeding budget attains its min-
imum when qb = qa, implying that the firm should allocate
more budget to quality improvement to distance itself from
the rival firm. However, as the gap between qualities widens,
competition in qualities becomes less effective and firms
spend more budget on seeding. Proposition 4 demonstrates
the effect of each quality on the optimal seeding budget when
the other quality is fixed. In the next proposition, we compare
the seeding budget of two firms in the optimal allocation of
both firms.
Proposition 5: Given an equal budget, the firm with
higher quality also has higher seeding budget, i.e. if qa ≤ qb,
then ‖S∗a‖1 ≤ ‖S∗b ‖1.
Proof: From equations (10) and (11) it can be easily
seen that if qa ≤ qb, then vbc ≤ vac . As a result, more agents
satisfy the condition (11) for firm b compared to firm a and
therefore, ‖S∗a‖1 ≤ ‖S∗b ‖1.
This result is due to diminish return of quality which
means if a firm already has a high quality it would profit
less by spending on quality improvement and it would be
better for the firm to invest on seeding.
C. Effect of Model Parameters on Firms’ Decisions:
In this subsection we study the effect of parameters of the
model on the optimal allocation. There are two parameters:
network coefficient α, and discounting factor δ, that affect
the optimal strategy.
Proposition 6: The optimal seeding budget is an increas-
ing function of α and a decreasing function of δ.
Proof: As we saw earlier, the optimal seeding budget
is a decreasing function of the threshold value vac . Also,
since 12 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1, it can be easily seen
that numerator of λ in equation (7) is decreasing in α and
increasing in δ whereas denominator of the ratio is increasing
in α and decreasing in δ. Therefore, the threshold value vac
is a decreasing function of α and an increasing function of
δ. This completes the proof.
Preposition 6 implies that for a fixed graph and fixed
qualities, if α is higher then seeding budget will be higher
and quality improvement budget will be lower. This is
because higher α means a lower coefficient for the graph,
i.e. (1 − α), which in turn implies that the effect of the
graph and update dynamics is lower. Therefore, there is no
point for firms to improve the quality and take advantage
of the network structure to spread the product. Moreover,
if discounting factor δ is lower then seeding budget will be
higher and quality improvement budget will be lower. This
is because a low discounting factor indicates a short time
horizon in utility of firms, therefore, it is more profitable to
invest on seeding which is more effective in short term.
D. Effect of Seeding and Quality Cost on Firms’ Decisions:
In this subsection we study the effect of the seeding and
quality cost, i.e. cs and cq , on the optimal allocation of
seeding and quality improvement budgets.
Proposition 7: The optimal seeding budget is a decreasing
function of seeding cost cs and an increasing function of
quality improvement cost cq .
Proof: The optimal seeding budget is a decreasing
function of the threshold value vac . Also, we have
∂vac
∂cs
= k1 > 0,
∂vac
∂cq
=
−k2
c2q
< 0,
for some constants k1, k2 > 0. Therefore, the threshold value
of vac is an increasing function of the seeding cost cs and a
decreasing function of the quality improvement cost cq and
the result follows.
Preposition 7 implies that for a fixed graph, fixed qualities
and fixed parameters, if seeding cost cs is higher then the
seeding budget will be lower and the quality improvement
budget will be higher. On the other hand, if quality improve-
ment cost cq is higher then seeding budget will be higher
and quality improvement budget will be lower.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed and studied a strategic model of marketing
and product consumption in social networks. Two firms
providing products with preset qualities, compete for maxi-
mizing the consumption of their products in a social network.
Agents are myopic yet utility maximizing, given the quality
of the products and actions of their neighbors. This myopic
best response results in a local, linear update dynamics for
the consumptions of the agents. At some point in time, firms
spend a limited budget to marginally improve the quality of
their products and to give free offers to a set of agents in
the network in order to promote their products. We derived a
simple threshold rule for the optimal allocation of the budget
and described the resulting Nash equilibrium. We showed
that the optimal allocation of the budget depends on the entire
centrality distribution of the graph, quality of products, costs
of seeding and quality improvement, discounting factor and
network coefficient. In particular, we showed that a graph
with a higher number of agents with centralities above a
certain threshold, has a higher seeding budget in the optimal
allocation. Furthermore, if seeding budget is nonzero for a
balanced graph, it will be nonzero for any other graph too,
and if seeding budget is zero for a star graph, it will also be
zero for any other graph. We also showed that firms allocate
more budget to quality improvement when their qualities are
close, in order to distance themselves from the rival firm.
However, as the gap between qualities widens, competition in
qualities becomes less effective and firms spend more budget
on seeding.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Feick and L. Price, “The market maven: A diffuser of marketplace
information,” Journal of Marketing, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 83–97, 1987.
[2] P. Reingen, B. Foster, J. Brown, and S. Seidman, “Brand congruence
in interpersonal relations: A social network analysis,” Journal of
Consumer Research, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 771–783, 1984.
[3] D. Godes and D. Mayzlin, “Using online conversations to study word-
of-mouth communication,” Marketing Science, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 545–
560, 2004.
[4] C. Ballester, A. Calvo´-Armengol, and Y. Zenou, “Who’s who in
networks. wanted: the key player,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 5,
pp. 1403–1417, 2006.
[5] S. Bharathi, D. Kempe, and M. Salek, “Competitive influence max-
imization in social networks,” Internet and Network Economics,
vol. 4858, pp. 306–311, 2007.
[6] A. Galeotti and S. Goyal, “Influencing the influencers: a theory of
strategic diffusion,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 40, no. 3,
pp. 509–532, 2009.
[7] D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, and E´. Tardos, “Maximizing the spread of
influence through a social network,” in Proceedings of the ninth ACM
SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data
mining, pp. 137–146, 2003.
[8] D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, and E´. Tardos, “Influential nodes in a
diffusion model for social networks,” Automata, Languages and Pro-
gramming, vol. 3580, pp. 1127–1138, 2005.
[9] G. Chasparis and J. Shamma, “Control of preferences in social
networks,” in Proceedings of 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC), pp. 6651–6656, 2010.
[10] A. Vetta, “Nash equilibria in competitive societies, with applications
to facility location, traffic routing and auctions,” in The 43rd Annual
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 416–425,
2002.
[11] G. Ellison, “Learning, local interaction, and coordination,” Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 1047–
1071, 1993.
[12] M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob, “Learning, mutation, and long
run equilibria in games,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 29–56, 1993.
[13] J. Harsanyi and R. Selten, “A general theory of equilibrium selection
in games,” MIT Press Books, vol. 1, 1988.
[14] H. Young, “The evolution of conventions,” Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 57–84, 1993.
[15] H. Young, Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary
theory of institutions. Princeton University Press, 2001.
[16] H. P. Young, “The diffusion of innovations in social networks,”
Economy as an Evolving Complex System. Proceedings volume in
the Santa Fe Institute studies in the sciences of complexity, vol. 3,
pp. 267–282, 2002.
[17] A. Montanari and A. Saberi, “The spread of innovations in social
networks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 107,
no. 47, pp. 20196–20201, 2010.
[18] J. Kleinberg, “Cascading behavior in networks: Algorithmic and
economic issues,” Algorithmic game theory, vol. 24, pp. 613–632,
2007.
[19] S. Goyal and M. Kearns, “Competitive contagion in networks,” in
Proceedings of the 44th symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 759–
774, 2012.
[20] K. Bimpikis, A. Ozdaglar, and E. Yildiz, “Competing over networks,”
submitted for publication, 2013. Available online at http://web.
mit.edu/asuman/www/publications.htm.
[21] A. Fazeli and A. Jadbabaie, “Duopoly pricing game in networks with
local coordination effects,” in Proceedings of 51st IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 2684–2689, 2012.
[22] A. Fazeli and A. Jadbabaie, “Game theoretic analysis of a strategic
model of competitive contagion and product adoption in social net-
works,” in Proceedings of 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control (CDC), pp. 74–79, 2012.
[23] A. Fazeli and A. Jadbabaie, “Targeted marketing and seeding products
with positive externality,” in Proceedings of 50th Annual Allerton
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton),
pp. 1111–1117, 2012.
